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I. INTRODUCrION
For years arbitration has existed as an alternate forum for solving labor
disputes and more recently has become a popular instrument in collective
bargaining agreements. In fact, arbitration is the most widely used dispute
resolution mechanism in unionized industries.' The professional sports
industry is no exception, as player unions have evolved in the past few
decades and achieved various important concessions for players.
Historically, collectivebargaining agreements contained arbitration provisions
to solve labor disputes between employees and management, but a recent
practice is the application of arbitration provisions to cover differences
between players, agents, and team management.
One particular union for professional athletes, the National Football
League Players Association (NFLPA), became the exclusive bargaining
representative of professional football players in the National Football League
(NFL) and instituted an arbitration procedure to specifically cover conflicts
between NFL players and their contract advisors (agents) in the NFLPA
Regulations Governing Contract Advisors ("NFLPA Regulations").3 As a
result of these regulations, arbitration has played an integral role in shaping
the behavior of both parties in the player-agent relationship in professional
football.
The National Labor Relations Act permits a union to become the exclusive
bargaining representative for all the employees of an employer if a majority
of employees support the union and the proper procedure for certification is
followed.4 The NFLPA obtained the support of a majority of players in the
NFL and was recognized as the first union of professional athletes certified
1. Abrams, Sports Labor Relations: The Arbitrator's Turn At Bat, 5 ENT. & SPORTS. L.J.
1, 3 n.11 (1988) (citing the Bureau of National Affairs' survey of collective bargaining
agreements which found that 99% of its sample of contracts contained an arbitration provision).
See also L. MRRIFIELD, T. ST. ANTOINE, & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 647 (1989) (citing
1981 study by U.S. Department of Labor).
2. Ensor, Comparison of Arbitration Decisions Involving Tennination In Major League
Baseball, The National Basketball Association, and The National Football League, 32 ST. Louis
U.LJ. 135 (1987).
3. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS AssocIATioN's REGULATIONS GOVERNINo CONTRACT
ADvIsoRS § 7 (Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n 1983 and as amended October 1, 1988)
[hereinafter NFLPA REGULATIONS].
4. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1990).
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by the National Labor Relations Board.! The NFLPA entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with the NFL Management Council,
representing owners of NFL teams, on September 4, 1983. This collective
bargaining agreement provided only a minimum salary standard and other
basic amenities for NFL players.7
The NFLPA was given the right to enact the NFLPA Regulations in the
original collective bargaining agreement between the NFLPA and the NFL
owners. Under this plan, the NFLPA reserved the exclusive right for "the
NFLPA or its agent" to negotiate individual NFL players' contracts.! Sports
agents could become "agents" of the NFLPA by becoming certified as
NFLPA "contract advisors."9 With this wording, the NFLPA was able to
subject all agents involved in negotiations and financial affairs for players in
connection with NFL team contracts to an arbitration procedure to solve
disputes between the parties."°
The NFLPA Regulations were promulgated as an outgrowth from the
collective bargaining agreement to cure the evils present in the sports agent
profession and offers arbitration as a quick, efficient solution to these
problems. The NFLPA enacted the NFLPA Regulations because many agents
were taking a substantial portion of the player's salary as a charge for the
5. Telephone interview with Mark Levin, NFLPA Agent System Coordinator (Jan. 11,
1990).
6. Ensor, supra note 2, at 138.
7. Note, Regulation of Sports Agents: Since at First It Hasn't Succeeded, Try Federal
Legislation, 39 HAsTNGs L.J. 1031, 1043 (1988) (authored by David Lawrence Dunn).
8. NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis in original). This language is based
upon Article XXII, § 2 of the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFLPA and
the NFL Management Council, which gave the NFLPA the authority and duty to promulgate the
NFLPA Regulations. Under federal labor law, the NFLPA, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of NFL players, was permitted to promulgate regulations to govern the
representation of NFL players in individual contract negotiations. The National Labor Relations
Act states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment.
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1990).
9. NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 3, § 1.
10. Id. § 7(A).
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negotiations and engaging in suspect conduct as financial advisors." The
NFLPA Regulations states this reason in the introduction by providing: "This
system was developed because of the growing concern among NFL players
about the quality of representation offered in the past by lawyers, agents, and
others in individual contract negotiations with NFL clubs."2 Many sports
experts have expressed attitudes favoring this type of regulation to protect
players from agent exploitation. In an effort to promote methods of regula-
tion to protect athletes from the unscrupulous conduct of some agents, one
author noted:
A dramatic increase in the amounts of money paid for the services of
professional athletes has caused an increase in unethical conduct by
athlete agents. This increase also has prompted frequent legal disputes.
Many professional athletes find their on-the-field accomplishments being
overshadowed by their off-the-field legal difficulties. At no time has
the need to regulate athlete agents been greater than at the present. Any
form of regulation must control and deter unethical conduct by agents.
In addition, the regulations must allow the athlete to make the best
business decision available when entering into a contract with a
professional team.'
Many states have also enacted legislation regulating the actions of agents
in their dealings with professional athletes or prospective professional
athletes. 14 These statutes impose criminal sanctions on agents violating these
rules, but do not set forth a method of dispute resolution. These statutes
have an advantage over nonlegislative regulations because statutory criminal
sanctions act as a more effective deterrent to agent abuse than the sanctions
imposed by other regulations. Also, a state's proven enforcement power
poses a far more tangible threat than do the untested enforcement mecha-
nisms of nonlegislative regulations.'5 Though state legislation has many
theoretical advantages, it has been ineffective due to variance of laws and
jurisdictional problems between the states.
The NFLPA Regulations avoids the jurisdictional problem inherent in state
legislation by creating a system where both parties agree to arbitration as a
forum for dispute resolution before entering into a legal relationship. This
11. Note, supra note 7, at 1031-33, 1035-37.
12. NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 3, Introduction at i.
13. Note, Regulating the Professional Spots Agent: Is California in the Right Ballpark?,
15 PAc. L.J. 1231, 1258 (1984) (authored by Dana Alden Fox).
14. Note, supra note 7, at 1049-64.
15. Id. at 1049.
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remedy avoids the following possible scenario of conflicting state legislation
postulated by a prominent sports attorney: If an agent lives in Connecticut,
has an office in New York, and is seeking to represent an athlete who just
finished college in Oklahoma, was chosen by the Dallas Cowboys in the NFL
draft, and whose mother lives in Los Angeles; and the mother, son, and
prospective agent meet in California to discuss representation; which state
can properly assert jurisdiction?16 The NFLPA Regulations solve this
problem for all NFL players and registered agents, regardless of their state
of residence. Both the player, as a member of the NFLPA, and the agent,
as a certified contract advisor of the NFLPA, consent to arbitration by their
membership in the organization.' 7 The United States Supreme Court ruled
that a union may force agents to become licensed by a union in order to
represent union members and thereby regulate the agents."a The Court stated
that federal labor law defines this activity as a statutory exemption to
antitrust law because the actors' union regulations at issue in the above case
were enacted for the self-interest of the union members and the agents were
a labor group in this type of relationship. 9 It has been debated whether the
NFLPA Regulations would similarly be exempt from antitrust review,' but
to date no party has challenged this arrangement.2
This Note will provide a historical view of the NFLPA Regulations and the
arbitration decisions rendered under its provisions to demonstrate what future
arbitrators might view as precedent in this unique area of law. An intricate
analysis of the details of the NFLPA Regulations allows a better
understanding of the arbitration decisions based on these regulations.
16. Id. at 1065 (citing telephone interview with Lloyd Shefsky, former President of the
National Sports Lawyers Association, Oct. 2, 1986).
17. NFLPA REULATIONS, supra note 3, § 7.
18. H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981).
19. Id. at 717.
20. Note, The NFL Players Association's Agent, Certification Plan: Is it Exempt fron
Antitrust Review?, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 699 (1984) (authored by Lori J. Lefferts).




II. SCOPE OF NFLPA REGUL4ONS
An agent must be certified by the NFLPA before undertaking the job of
negotiating a contract with an NFL team under the NFLPA Regulations.?
These regulations specify types of illegal conduct as well as providing rules
regarding the maximum amount of fees an agent may collect from a player.
The regulations govern any agent involved in negotiating contracts with NFL
teams or advising individual players in this context.' An agent is investi-
gated and a license denied if the agent has been involved in prior conduct
constituting fraud, misrepresentation, embezzlement, misappropriation of
funds, or theft.' Before an agent can represent a player, the parties are
obligated to sign a Standard Representation Agreement, which is a supple-
ment to the NFLPA Regulations, along with an Application for Certification.'
The regulations outline activities or conduct of contract advisors, or
agents, which are to be governed by the rules. Once certified as an NFLPA
contract advisor, an agent is governed by all guidelines set forth in the
NFLPA Regulations. The relevant rules include the following: (1) the agent
and player are obligated to sign a "standard representation agreement" or
similar form approved by the NFLPA;' (2) a set maximum percentage of the
player's compensation that an agent may collect as a fee;' (3) an agent
cannot collect a fee until the player actually receives the compensation upon
which it was based;' (4) an agent cannot induce a player to sign a represen-
22. NFLPA REouLATIoNs, supra note 3, § 1.
23. Id. See also Exhibit C, Standard Representation Agreement Between NFLPA Contract
Advisor and Player. Id.
24. Id. § 2(C).
25. Id. § 4. It is noteworthy that § 3 provides: "The Contract Advisor shall be solely
responsible and liable for, and shall hold the NFLPA harmless from, any damages or claims
arising from his or her activities as contract advisors." Id. § 3.
26. Id. § 4(A), Exhibit C at C-1. Using the standardized form also provides the agent
with the benefit of being recognized as the exclusive contract advisor of the athlete. The
NFLPA Regulations prohibit an agent from drafting an advantageous representation contract by
providing, "A player may make an agreement with a Contract Advisor which is more, but not
less, favorable than the form contract contained in Exhibit C. No deviation, addition, or deletion
shall be made in the form contract without approval of the NFLPA." Id. § 4(A).
27. Id. § 4(D). "The maximum fee which may be charged or collected by a Contract
Advisor shall be no more than five percent (5 %) of the compensation received by the player in
excess of the minimum salary applicable to the player's years of service for that year."
28. Id.
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tation agreement with valuable consideration or misleading statements;19
(5) agents must disclose present and prior representation of NFL team
management personnel to their clients;' and (6) an agent is compelled to
resolve all disputes with a player/client arising under the regulations in
accordance with the arbitration procedure outlined in the regulations.3 These
rules basically cover all types of agent conduct involved in assisting a
professional football player to sign a contract with an NFL team, as well as
the financial services performed on behalf of a player/client. 2
III. THE ARBrrRATIoN PROCEDURE
The NFLPA Regulations require one party, either the player or agent, to
initiate arbitration proceedings by filing a written grievance within six months
from the date of the occurrence upon which the grievance is based or within
six months from the date on which the facts of the matter became known or
reasonably should have become known to the grievant, whichever is later.'
The other party must answer within only ten days of receipt of the
grievance.' Once the answer is filed, the NFLPA undertakes an investiga-
tion of the grievance and attempts to mediate the dispute.' If mediation is
unsuccessful, the petitioner has thirty days from receipt of the respondent's
answer to appeal to arbitration.3" The arbitrator is then selected by the
Executive Committee of the NFLPA, which is required to select "a person
with sufficient experience in arbitration of issues in either the sports or
entertainment business" to serve as the arbitrator. 7 This speedy process
allows the parties to resolve their dispute in a fast, efficient manner.
Many of the arbitration cases have involved the standard representation
agreement, which the agents and players are required to sign before an agent
29. Id. § 5(C).
30. Id. § 4(B). Contract advisors must attach a list of all their NFL management clients,
past and present, to the representation agreement. Each contract advisor must also forward a
copy of the list to the NFLPA. See also id. § 5(B)(2).
31. Id. § 7(A).
32. Id. § I(A)-(E).
33. Id. § 7(3).
34. Id. § 7(C).
35. Id. § 7(D).
36. Id. § 7(E).
37. Id. § 7(F).
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can perform any negotiation services for a player.3' An agent does not have
much leeway, because an agent cannot make a player sign an agreement that
is less favorable to the player than the form contract attached as an exhibit
to the NFLPA Regulations.39 The standard representation contract provides
a maximum fee that agents can charge players, a mandatory arbitration
clause, and a disclaimer of liability, which exculpates the NFLPA from any
liability caused by the agent's actions.'
The arbitration procedure outlined in the NFLPA Regulations have
efficiently handled more than sixty cases to date. The majority of these cases
have been resolved before a decision could be rendered. Mediation has
successfully resolved some of these cases, while others have been settled
before or after the initial hearing in front of the arbitrator. A few com-
plaints were withdrawn before the grievance could be heard on its merits.
Arbitrators have had the opportunity to render decisions in excess of twenty
cases and have established a proper standard of conduct in their opinions."
Only three arbitrators have had the opportunity to hear these cases: Kenneth
E. Moffett, John C. Culver, and Ronald P. Kaplan. Culver, a former United
States Senator from Iowa and collegiate football player at Harvard Universi-
ty, has ruled on over fifteen of the most recent cases and continues to act as
the designated arbitrator for this procedure due to his expertise in the area.'
The arbitrators have found a harmonious balance between a literal
interpretation of the regulations and equitable concerns. An arbitrator has
wide decision-making powers, but these arbitrators have never seriously
challenged modern legal constraints. The NFLPA Regulations grant an
arbitrator the ability to assess some or all of a party's costs to the opposing
party if the grievance is deemed frivolous in nature, but arbitrators have
never used this provision.' The decisions have covered small technical
38. See International Merchandising Corp. v. Smerlas (June 29, 1989) (Culver, Arb.);
Landrum v. Gross (Sept. 10, 1987) (Culver, Arb.); Cole v. Lustig (July 16, 1987) (Culver,
Arb.). All arbitration cases mentioned herein and hereafter were obtained from the NFLPA.
Inquiries can be directed to: NFLPA, 2021 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
Telephone number: (202) 463-2200.
39. See note 26, supra.
40. Id. Exhibit C.
41. Telephone interview with Tom DePaso, Esq., NFLPA Staff Counsel (Jan. 18, 1990).
42. Id.
43. NFLPAlRouLIrloNs, supra note 3, § 7(H). Parties have asked the arbitrator to award
attorney fees, but have been denied. See Fraley v. Roberts (Mar. 12, 1987) (Culver, Arb.);
Hafner v. Grant (Feb. 5, 1987) (Culver, Arb.).
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violations of the rules as well as clear cases of fraud.' Although most cases
to date have been brought on behalf of an agent seeking compensation,"
players have also initiated grievances against agents for a refund of monies
paid or a rescission of their agreement.'
The arbitration cases to date have covered many of the important rules
designated in the NFLPA Regulations. Players and agents have both initiated
this formality as a means for settling their disputes, and have complied with
the terms and remedies set forth in the decisions.' The NFLPA Regulations
state that each arbitration decision "will constitute full, final and complete
disposition of the dispute, and will be binding upon [the player and] the
Contract Advisor involved. . . .
Although arbitrators are in no way bound by prior decisions, they have
adopted the same patterns of reasoning as earlier arbitrators. 9 Consequently,
these cases must be analyzed to determine the likely outcome of future
grievances covering the same issues.
IV. ARrrRATION CASES
The cases to date have considered a number of important issues. The
arbitrators have strongly influenced the conduct of both players and agents
through their resolution of these disputes. Players and agents must now
abide by the standards of conduct enunciated in prior arbitration cases in
order to avoid this adversarial procedure being used against them. Compli-
ance with the required procedures has been excellent; only one default award
has been granted for an opponent's failure to attend a scheduled hearing."0
44. See Dickerson v. Rodri, at 15 (Aug. 3, 1989) (Kaplan, Arb.) (technical violation);
Bloom v. Harmon, at 17-20 (Oct. 28, 1987) (Culver, Arb.) (illegal inducements).
45. See Singman v. Young (June 23, 1989) (Culver, Arb.); Browner v. Browner (Apr.
14, 1987) (Culver, Arb.); Kiles v. Manley (Aug. 28, 1986) (Culver, Arb.).
46. See Cole v. Lustig (July 16, 1987) (Culver, Arb.); Robbins v. Courrege (Nov. 18,
1985) (Moffett, Arb.).
47. Telephone interview with Mark Levin, NFLPA Agent System Coordinator (Jan. 11,
1990).
48. NFLPA RouLATIONS, supra note 3, § 7(G). This section further states, "[T]he
Arbitrator will not have the jurisdiction or authority to add to, subtract from, or alter in any
way the provisions of these Regulations or any other applicable document."
49. Wilson v. Courrege (Nov. 12, 1986) (Culver, Arb.).
50. Letter from Arbitrator Kenneth E. Moffett to Joe McCall, an NFL player (Dec. 12,
1985) (notifying McCall of the default award entered in MeCall's favor against his former agent,
Jeff Allen; copies were sent to Jeff Allen and the NFLPA office).
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The most common subjects addressed in the cases are the timeliness of the
grievance, quantum meruit awards, and the fiduciary duty of the agent.
A. Timeliness of the Grievance
The NFLPA Regulations specify that a written grievance must be filed
within six months of the occurrence upon which the grievance was based or
within six months from the date on which the facts of the matter became
known or reasonably should have become known to the grievant, whichever
was later.'1 The arbitrators have liberally construed this statute of limitations
by allowing many complaints to proceed through the system regardless of the
time of occurrence and filing. Arbitrators have manipulated the filing
requirement for the benefit of both players and agents who have initiated
grievances. Thejustification for this leniency is that it allows the cases to be
heard instead of dismissed due to the statute of limitations.'
In one case, a player demanded a refund from his agent, and the arbitrator
was able to avoid confrontation with the statute of limitations by viewing the
violations of the agent as continuous, rather than a single occurrence.' This
tactic enabled the complaint to relate to the date of the last interaction
between the parties, as opposed to the date when the player forwarded
payment to his agent. The statute of limitations was therefore tolled until the
representation agreement was terminated. Arbitrator Culver ruled on the
merits of the case by stating:
[Tihe grievance is not based upon a single event or occurrence but rather
on a series of transactions or non-transactions spanning a period of several
months. In this sense, the grievance alleges a continuing violation that does not
render it untimely. Indeed, an appropriate date by which to measure timeliness
would be the date when the relationship between the parties formally ended.
54
In a few cases brought by agents seeking compensation from players, the
arbitrator successfully construed the time period in favor of the agent to
51. NFLPA REGuLATIONS, supra note 3, § 7(B). All time limitations in the arbitration
procedure may be extended by mutual agreement of the parties involved. Id. § 7(A).
52. See Hafner v. Grant (Feb. 5, 1987) (Culver, Arb.) (agent seeking compensation for
services performed); Wilson v. Courrege (Nov. 12, 1986) (Culver, Arb.) (player seeking a
refund from agent).
53. Wilson v. Courrege (Nov. 12, 1986) (Culver, Arb.).
54. Id. at 15.
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allow the cases to proceed to arbitration. In Hafner v. Bellinger," the agent,
Hafner, was permitted to bring the complaint based on his good faith effort
to institute a grievance within the required time. Although Bellinger never
received a copy of the grievance, Arbitrator Culver explained that "Mr.
Hafner made a diligent effort in good faith to serve Mr. Bellinger with a
copy of the grievance" by sending a copy of the grievance to the front office
of Bellinger's team, the Buffalo Bills. 6 The arbitrator further ruled that
Bellinger and his counsel were made aware of the grievance upon receiving
notice from the arbitrator that a hearing had been scheduled. The arbitrator
condemned the player's complacency by adding that the player and his
counsel "had sufficient time between the notice of the hearing and the
hearing itself to obtain a copy of the grievance and familiarize themselves
with its allegations. "' The player could have obtained a copy from the
NFLPA because the regulations require an agent to provide the NFLPA with
a copy of the grievance served on a player.5 8 In another case involving an
agent seeking compensation from a player, the arbitrator ruled that the six
month period did not begin to run until the agent was aware of the player's
refusal to pay for negotiation services performed. 9 The grievance was
timely because the agent initiated the grievance procedure after receiving no
response from two billing letters sent to the player. 6°
Arbitrators have liberally interpreted the statute of limitations contained in
the NFLPA Regulations in order to allow the maximum number of cases to
proceed to arbitration. Overall, arbitrators have acted fairly in cases
involving the timeliness of a grievance. Both players and agents have
benefited from this liberal interpretation of the regulations.
Arbitrators have been more strict in cases involving a late appeal to
arbitration after mediation. The NFLPA Regulations provide that once an
answer is filed, the NFLPA will attempt to mediate the dispute on an
informal basis.61 Then, if the grievance is not resolved through mediation
within thirty days, either party may appeal to arbitration, but in any event
the grievance must be appealed within ninety days, or it shall be considered
55. Hafner v. Bellinger (Jan. 13, 1987) (Culver, Arb.).
56. Id. at 11.
57. Id.
58. NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 3, § 7(B).
59. Blatt v. Gross (Apr. 5, 1988) (Culver, Arb.).
60. Id. at 11-12.
61. NFLPA REGuLATIONS, supra note 3, § 7(D).
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withdrawn and dismissed.' Arbitrators have taken a literal interpretation of
this language by dismissing grievances in which appeals to arbitration were
not filed in a timely manner. The two cases involving appeals to arbitration
that were not filed within ninety days of receipt of the answer were dis-
missed.'
B. Quantum Meruit Awards
Quantum meruit awards exemplify the equitable powers of the arbitrator.
Quantum meruit awards give one party to a contract the reasonable value of
services rendered, regardless of the specific terms of the contract. Quantum
meruit awards have been granted in situations in which agents have violated
parts of the NFLPA Regulations, but still deserve some compensation for
their efforts. This type of award is very controversial because it allows the
agent to collect fees after engaging in conduct contrary to the spirit of the
regulations. Nevertheless, agents have been awarded payments from players
under this theory, regardless of their conduct.
The requirement of a written contract has been the subject of a few cases
involving agents seeking compensation for services performed. The
arbitrator has repeatedly stressed the importance of a written contract. In the
absence of a written contract, the arbitrator must decide whether the agent is
entitled to any compensation for services performed on behalf of the player.
The NFLPA Regulations provide that before an agent can negotiate for a
player with an NFL team, the player and agent must execute a signed written
agreement in the form prescribed by the regulations.' In addition to this
provision, the NELPA Regulations state that "[a]ll agreements between a
Contract Advisor and a player which are not in writing or which are not in
compliance with these Regulations shall be of no force and effect."' For this
reason, arbitrators have struggled with grievances involving agents seeking
compensation without valid representation agreements. Quantum meruit
awards, which would not be permitted under a literal interpretation of the
regulations, prevent a player from being unjustly enriched from services
provided by the agent."
62. Id. § 7(E).
63. See Western Pro Sports v. Starring (May 18, 1988) (Culver, Arb.); Browner v.
Browner (Apr. 14, 1987) (Culver, Arb.).
64. NFLPA REGuLATIONS, supra note 3, § 4(A).
65. Id.
66. See Blatt v. Gross, at 15 (Apr. 5, 1988) (Culver, Arb.).
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In Hafizer v. Grant,' the representation agreement specified that the agent
had to conduct "all" negotiations in order to receive a fee. But through no
fault of his own, the agent, Haflier, was unable to deal directly with the
player's team. The team disregarded Hafner in much of the contract negotia-
tions due to his negotiating strategy and his access to otherwise undisclosed
salary information. As a result of Hafner's inability to negotiate with the
team, the player, Grant, personally negotiated the terms of his contract. The
arbitrator used the equitable theory of quantum meruit to award Hafner fees
for his services. The arbitrator based this decision on an overall reading of
the agreement and concluded that the agreement was not intended to deny the
agent compensation if he was not involved in every aspect of the negotiation
process.' Although the agent played a significant role behind the scenes in
the negotiations, the arbitrator only awarded him the reasonable value of the
services he performed, not the fee percentage contained in the contract. This
ruling illustrates the equitable nature of the arbitrator's decision making
process and the manner in which an arbitrator typically attempts to balance
the interests instead of ruling completely in favor of either party.
In another case involving an agent seeking compensation in the absence of
a written agreement, the arbitrator again issued an award based on quantum
meruit. In Blatt v. Gross,' a representation agreement naming Michael Blatt
as contract advisor for Al Gross expired before Blatt was able to successfully
negotiate a contract for Gross with the Cleveland Browns. Blatt and a
colleague, as operators of Sun West Sports, initiated a grievance against
Gross to collect money for the last offer conveyed to Gross under their
representation. Blatt had successfully negotiated a two-year contract with the
Browns that had expired along with the representation agreement. During
negotiations with the Browns for a new contract, Blatt submitted various
offers to Gross, who rejected them based on salary considerations. Later,
Gross sent a letter to Blatt terminating representation and was able to sign a
new contract under the guidance of another agent. The problem that
confronted the arbitrator was that the original representation agreement had
expired before the negotiations with the Browns. The arbitrator pointed out
the necessity of a written contract, but refused to deny the agents compensa-
tion. Although the agents did not succeed in negotiating an NFL player
contract acceptable to the player, the arbitrator focused on the unjust enrich-
ment to the player and awarded the agents an amount based on a reasonable
67. Hafner v. Grant (Feb. 5, 1987) (Culver, Arb.).
68. Id. at 19-20.
69. Blatt v. Gross (Apr. 5, 1988) (Culver, Arb.).
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hourly rate under the theory of quantum meruit.70 Even in the absence of a
representation agreement, agents were able to receive compensation for
services provided to a player, further demonstrating the arbitrator's desire to
appease both parties. The arbitrator satisfied both parties by allowing the
player to avoid the possibility of having to pay an excessive amount of
money based on a percentage of his contract, and by enabling the agents to
receive a fair amount of compensation.
The quantum meruit theory was extended to include a situation in which
agents represented a player with the use of a deviant representation
agreement under NFLPA standards.7' The NFLPA Regulations require a
player and agent to sign a standard representation agreement before an agent
engages in contract negotiations with an NFL team on behalf of an NFL
player. Any deviations, additions, or deletions from the standard agreement
must be approved by the NFLPA.' In this case, the NFLPA never approved
the deviations from the standard agreement, thereby negating the existence
of the agreement. The arbitrator displayed his compromising attitude once
again by awarding the agents a reasonable value for the services they
provided to their client, instead of declaring the agreement null and void.73
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Arbitrators have not been as accommodating in cases dealing with an agent
breaching the fiduciary duty owed to a player. Many representation
agreements provide for the agent to act as a financial advisor for the player
in addition to engaging in negotiations on the player's behalf. The arbitrators
have made it clear that agents breaching the fiduciary duty owed to a player
in their representation relationship will be denied any compensation, regard-
less of the beneficial services performed. One example is a grievance filed
by an agent who worked hard, but was unable to negotiate a contract with an
NFL team on his client's behalf before the representation agreement ex-
pired.74 The arbitrator denied the agent's grievance due to the agent's
dishonesty regarding a bank loan signed by the parties. The agent was
70. Id. at 15-16, 18 n.3. The reasonable hourly rate was $125 because the expired
representation agreement stated that Gross agreed to pay Sun West the lesser of $125 per hour
or $1000 if Blatt was not able to negotiate a contract above the minimum salary level.
71. Landrum v. Gross (Sept. 10, 1987) (Culver, Arb.).
72. NFLPA REOULATioNs, supra note 3, § 4(A).
73. Landrum v. Gross, at 15-16 (Sept. 10, 1987) (Culver, Arb.).
74. Segers v. Clark (Aug. 29, 1986) (Culver, Arb.).
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denied all compensation, including an award based on quantum meruit.7 s In
the decision, the arbitrator apparently attempted to transmit a message that
a breach of fiduciary duty would not be tolerated because the NFLPA
Regulations were promulgated to alleviate this problem.
It is difficult for the arbitrator to determine the point at which the agent
breaches the fiduciary duty owed to his client. Arbitrators have indicated
that a player bears the burden of proving an agent's breach of fiduciary duty.
It is not exactly clear what behavior constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty on
the part of an agent, but a player must at the very least show that the agent
was under a duty to provide financial advice and did so in an unreasonable
manner. 76 Many representation agreements do not include the payment of
fees for financial advice, but player-agent contracts stating that an agent will
provide financial services for a player subject the agent to a duty to provide
reasonable financial advice.
The arbitrators have frequently been confronted with cases involving
representation agreements containing a blanket fee provision for negotiations
and financial services. Two of these cases involved the actions of agent Joe
Courrege in his dealings with players James "Tootie" Robbins7 and Darryal
Wilson. 7s The representation agreements each provided for a payment of six
percent of the player's salary to be paid to the agent for negotiations and
financial services. 79 These players filed grievances at different times seeking
a refund of money paid based on the agent's breach of his fiduciary duty.
The arbitrators' rulings on these separate cases forced the agents to separate
the fees charged for negotiations from the fees charged for financial services.
In both cases, the arbitrator ruled that Courrege had breached the fiduciary
duty he owed to the players."0
In the grievance filed by Robbins, Arbitrator Moffett ruled that Courrege
breached his fiduciary responsibilities with respect to the administration and
management of Robbins' funds."' This conclusion was based on the
substantial tax liability Robbins incurred during the years of representation
75. Id. at 16-17.
76. See Dickerson v. Rodri, at 15 (Aug. 3, 1989) (Kaplan, Arb.).
77. Robbins v. Courrege (Nov. 18, 1985) (Moffett, Arb.).
78. Wilson v. Courrege (Nov. 12, 1986) (Culver, Arb.).
79. Id. at 1; Robbins v. Courrege, at 1 (Nov. 18, 1985) (Moffett, Arb.).
80. Wilson v. Courrege at 18-20, 25 (Nov. 12, 1986) (Culver, Arb.); Robbins v. Courrege,
at 1-2 (Nov. 18, 1985) (Moffett, Arb.).
81. Robbins v. Courrege, at 1-2 (Nov. 18, 1985) (Moffett, Arb.).
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and the absence of an effective tax plan.' The arbitrator was forced to
determine the amount of fees charged for financial services in order to refund
these payments to the player. Arbitrator Moffett found a fee allocation of
two percent for negotiation services and four percent for financial manage-
ment services to be an equitable division based on the amount of time spent
on these services. The arbitrator noted that contract negotiations are essen-
tially a one-time task, while tax planning and financial management are
carried on all year and require more time and effort.'3
Arbitrator Culver followed the reasoning of Arbitrator Moffett concerning
the allocation of fees in Wilson v. Courrege.4 Arbitrator Culver used the
same fee allocation, but ordered Courrege to refund only the fees paid for tax
advice, and not the fees charged for real estate investments. Courrege was
ordered to refund fees paid for tax advice because he failed to explain to
Wilson the concept of the present value of money when putting together a tax
plan.' Although Wilson lost a considerable amount of money in a few
suspect real estate investments assembled by Courrege, Arbitrator Culver
denied a refund saying, "Courrege had done everything a competent financial
counselor would have done under the circumstances. '' 6  This decision
illustrates the arbitrator's abhorrence of breaches of fiduciary duty, and the
heavy burden placed on players asserting this type of grievance.
D.Miscellaneous Subjects
The arbitrators have been confronted with a multitude of other issues.
The resolution of many of these seemingly trivial issues has helped to shape
the behavior of players and agents in future dealings. The standard tepresen-
tation agreement is only five pages in length, resulting in ambiguous provi-
sions and possible omissions. As a result, arbitrators have been asked to
resolve many questions arising from this form contract.
A few agents named in arbitration grievances have sought to hide behind
their corporation as a shield from personal liability. This defense was based
on the contention that an individual is not a proper party in an arbitration
proceeding if the player contracted with the agent's firm, instead of the agent
personally. Arbitrators have rejected this argument, citing the NFLPA
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2.
84. Wilson v. Courrege, at 26-27 (Nov. 12, 1986) (Culver, Arb.).
85. Id. at 20, 25.
86. Id. at 25.
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Regulations, which state that only individuals can serve as contract advisors,
not corporations or other entities." Therefore, even if a player signs a
representation agreement with a firm, the agent involved in the negotiations
will be held personally liable for any improper conduct.
Another important subject covered in the arbitration cases is the timing of
fee payments paid by a player to his agent. Under the NFLPA Regulations,
fees "shall not be due and payable to [the] Contract Advisor unless and until
the Player receives the compensation provided for in the player contract(s)
negotiated by [the] Contract Advisor."" The arbitrator has strictly enforced
this provision by ruling that a player is not under an obligation to remunerate
his agent until the team has commenced payment of the player's salary or
signing bonus." The import of the theory of "percentage of money earned,"
on which all player contracts are based, is that a player is only required to
pay an agent the stated percentage of the money he has actually received. If
a player is released or traded before being fully compensated, the agent is
only entitled to the contractual percentage of money earned and received by
the player. This section of the regulations is based on equitable concerns, so
agents cannot manipulate the terms of a contract to force a player to pay a
higher amount than the bargain requires. The NFLPA Regulations also
release a player from contractual liabilities to an agent if the player signs a
new player contract in the NFL prior to the termination of the contract in
question, a policy which may grant the players an unfair advantage.' A
literal interpretation of this provision would permit a player to renegotiate his
contract to the detriment of his agent by allowing the player to sign a new
contract to escape liability arising under the previous contract.
The arbitrators have been successful in retaining jurisdiction over issues
that did not initially appear to fall under the NFLPA Regulations. This broad
interpretation has allowed arbitrators to exert a significant influence over the
conduct of both players and agents. This procedure has flourished with
continued help from various courts, where judges have refused to intervene
by denying requests to avoid arbitration. Both state and federal courts have
adhered to the binding effect of the NFLPA's arbitration procedure for
players and agents.
87. Cole v. Lustig, at 10 (July 16, 1987) (Culver, Arb.).
88. NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 3, Exhibit C, § 2.
89. See Singman v. Young, at 15-16 (June 23, 1989) (Culver, Arb.).
90. NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 3, Exhibit C, § 6.
[Vol. 6:1 1990]1
NFLPA ARBITRATION
V. JUDIcIAL ADHERENCE TO THE NFLPA ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE
State and federal courts have exhibited a reluctance to rule on cases falling
under the NFLPA Regulations' arbitration provision. For the most part,
judges have chosen to avoid judicial interference in labor disputes.9'
In one state action, a player who was successful in an earlier arbitration
proceeding moved to confirm the arbitration award. The agent responded by
moving to vacate the award due to insufficient notice.' Thejudge remanded
the case, ruling that the arbitrator must determine whether the agent received
proper notice of the arbitration proceedings. In the decision, the judge
expressed the view that the arbitrator has the power to ultimately determine
all issues involved in the proceeding.' Another state court upheld the
NFLPA arbitration procedure on a number of different grounds.' The
defendant, an NFL player, opposed arbitration on jurisdictional grounds
relating to fraud and illegality, but the judge ruled that an agreement to
arbitrate is valid even if the substantive portions of the contract were induced
by fraud due to the broad scope of the arbitration clause.' The judge also
ruled that an athlete who has not played in the NFL before signing a standard
representation agreement with an agent is still considered a "player" under
the NFLPA Regulations, and both parties are subject to its rules. The judge
reasoned that once a player-agent agreement is signed, the arbitration
provision comes into effect because the obligations of the contract are only
triggered if the player signs with an NFL team. Therefore, the NFLPA
Regulations must apply to these agreements because signing with an NFL
team creates automatic affiliation with the NFLPA.'
On one rare occasion, a federal district court rendered a final decision in
a case involving the NFLPA Regulations' arbitration procedure, but only due
to unusual circumstances.' This highly publicized case, involving the
fraudulent activities of agents Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom, was insti-
tuted in a federal district court by the agents who sought to recover monies
spent inducing certain players to sign representation agreements with them.
91. National Football League Players Ass'n v. National Football League, 724 F. Supp.
1027 (D.D.C. 1989).
92. Allen v. McCall, 521 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
93. Id. at 183.
94. Walters v. Harmon, 135 Misc. 2d 905, 516 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
95. Id. at 905-06, 526 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875-76.
96. Id. at 906, 526 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876.
97. Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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The defendants, current NFL players, moved to stay the proceedings pending
arbitration. The judge denied the arbitrator a chance to rule on the dispute
by declaring the representation agreements null and void as a violation of
public policy.' The judge basically made the decision for the arbitrator by
declaring, "The principles requiring non-enforcement of contracts on public
policy grounds apply equally to arbitration agreements."' These agents were
later convicted in federal court for committing several crimes based on their
fraudulent inducements to college players.'
VI. REcmrr DEvE.oPMmrs
The NFLPA has renounced its position as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the players for the best interests of the players."' If the
NFLPA were to remain as a union, this would provide antitrust insulation for
the owners. The owners would then be permitted to implement unilateral
changes of certain subjects contained in the expired collective bargaining
agreement contrary to the wishes of the players.0"
98. Id. at 161.
99. Id. at 162.
100. United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. IMl. 1989). A federal district
court jury convicted Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom for defrauding two universities by using
cash to lure college athletes into signing improper contracts. The jury deliberated forty hours
before convicting Walters and Bloom on charges of racketeering and mail fraud. But the fate
of these individuals is presently unclear because a court of appeals reversed and remanded the
case and presented instructions for a new trial. This reversal was based on the district court's
failure to provide proper jury instructions, as well as the court's denial of Bloom's motion for
severance. (See United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1990).
101. Telephone interview withTom DePaso, Esq., NFLPAStaff Counsel (Jan. 18, 1990).
102. Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 888 F.2d 559, 573-74 (8th Cir. 1989), (Lay, C.J.,
dissenting). Chief Judge Lay alluded to this inescapable result in his dissenting opinion denying
the NFLPA's attempt to sue the NFL and its teams on antitrust grounds. The NFLPA sought
to deny the NFL's imposition of a "First Refusal/Compensation system, [which] provided that
a team could retain a veteran free agent by exercising a right of first refusal and by matching a
competing club's offer." Id. at 561 (Gibson, J.). The NFLPA challenged this system as an
unlawful restraint of trade, a direct violation of antitrust law. Chief Judge Lay stated:
[Tihis court's unprecedented decision leads to the ineluctable result of union
decertification in order to invoke rights to which the players are clearly entitled under the
antitrust laws. The plain and simple truth of the matter is that the union should not be
compelled, short of self-destruction, to accept illegal restraints it deems undesirable.
Union decertification is hardly a worthy goal to pursue in balancing labor policy with the
antitrust laws.
Id. at 573-74 (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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The NFLPA renounced its representation of NFL players by sending a
letter to NFL management which informed team owners that the NFLPA
ceased to exist as the exclusive bargaining representative of the players as of
the date of the letter.'n This strategic legal maneuver enables NFL players
individually to commence suit against team owners for instituting changes in
the expired collective bargaining agreement that violate federal antitrust
laws.1"' The NFLPA made this decision because a United States Court of
Appeals ruled that the NFLPA could not institute an antitrust suit against
team owners over a particular subject of the expired collective bargaining
agreement so long as it remained the exclusive bargaining representative of
the players.' °
The NFLPA decided to change its objective and direction, transforming
itself from a labor union to an association specializing in public relations,
marketing, and group licensing. It will continue to offer legal advice to
players choosing to become members as well as providing salary information
to registered agents. The NFLPA actually existed as a voluntary nonprofit
association from 1956 to 1971 before becoming the exclusive bargaining
representative of the NFL players. The association was originally organized
by players on the Green Bay Packers in an effort to have clean clothing for
practices. At that time, players did not enjoy the luxury of being provided
with clean "socks and jocks" for the three practices that took place each day
in the preseason, so they formed an association to take care of this task and
to deal with other problems with team management.'
The NFLPA has retained its name, becoming a voluntary association for
players, much like the American Bar Association exists for attorneys and
the American Medical Association exists for physicians. Agents will not be
forced to become certified by the NFLPA to represent NFL players, but can
decide individually whether to become registered. The agents will be
encouraged to register because the NFLPA will provide its registered agents
with useful salary information concerning the values attributed to each
position on the playing field, which will help these agents in their negotiation
of player contracts." 7 The association will also continue to provide an
abundance of services and benefits to help the players. The NFLPA will
103. Supra, note 101.
104. USA Today, Dec. 5, 1989, § C (Sports), at 1.
105. See Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989).
106. Interview with John Macik, NFLPA Staff Representative, at NFLPA Contract
Advisors Seminar, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 16, 1990).
107. Telephone interview with Mark Levin, NFLPA Agent System Coordinator (Jan. 11,
1990).
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benefit the players by coordinating and funding lawsuits necessary to protect
individual negotiations and to secure the free market, approving agents,
conducting financial planning seminars, and providing other legal and
medical assistance." As a result of this transformation, some provisions of
the NFLPA Regulations have been amended, with the new version being
titled the Code of Conduct for NFLPA Member Contract Advisors ("Code of
Conduct"). °  Although changes have occurred within the NFLPA, the Code
of Conduct arbitration procedure is almost identical to the one outlined in the
NFLPA Regulations. The sole change is the deletion of the mediation aspect.
The parties are no longer required to attempt to mediate their disputes before
arbitration. Now the parties can proceed more quickly through the system
because the arbitrator is provided with copies of the grievance within thirty
days of the date the NFLPA receives the grievance.1 ' The deletion of the
mediation step does not impair the parties' ability to mediate their dispute
because all time periods in the arbitration process can be extended by mutual
consent. Furthermore, the parties always retain the option of settlement.'
Disputes will inevitably arise between players and agents, so this
procedure will continue to be used to resolve many grievances. Decertifica-
tion means that agents may represent players without becoming registered by
the NFLPA, but agents taking this route will not be able to enjoy the multi-
tude of benefits bestowed on them as registered agents of the NFLPA.
Agents deciding to become registered contract advisors of the NFLPA must
108. PLAYBoox, Vol. 1, No. 2 at 3 (Dec. 14, 1989) (Playbook is an NFLPA publication
for players and agents).
109. CODE or CONDUCT FOR NFLPA CONTRACT ADVISORS (Nat'l Football League Players
Ass'n. 1990) (effective April 1, 1990) [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT]. The introduction states:
On November 6, 1989, the NFLPA renounced its right to act as the exclusive
collective bargaining agent for NFL players and also ceased to function as a labor
organization. The NFLPA reconstituted itself as a professional association dedicated in
part to protecting the individual contracting rights of professional football players. As a
result of this action, the competence with which an agent performs his or her job in
representing an NFL player has gained increased importance ....
If an agent elects to become an NFLPA Member Contract Advisor, he must follow
the CODE OF CONDUCT established herein. Membership as a Contract Advisor is totally
voluntary, but once an agent joins he can be expelled for a failure to adhere to the Code.
Our Association is dedicated to assisting NFL players in acquiring the best possible
individual representation. We are of the opinion that agents who decide to become
Member Contract Advisors and adhere to this CODE OF CONDUCT will help improve the
quality of the services that they provide their players/clients.
110. Id. § 5(E).




adhere to the Code of Conduct or be subject to certain sanctions, including
possible termination."u One of the requirements for an agent to maintain
membership in good standing will be to use the mandatory representation
agreement contained in the Code of Conduct, which includes the arbitration
provision."t
The representation agreement contained in the Code of Conduct is almost
identical to the standard representation agreement contained in the NFLPA
Regulations. The only major change is the deletion of a set maximum fee
that agents can charge the players for services rendered. The other
modifications are primarily alterations in word structure in order to clarify
the fact that the NFLPA is no longer the exclusive bargaining representative
of the players. Although the NFLPA no longer regulates the compensation
received by agents, the association will publish industry averages in its
periodic newsletter to members, which should maintain a similar payment
scale in the representation agreements.' 4 These industry averages will reflect
the average percentage of a player's salary charged by an agent who is a
member of the NFLPA. Presently, agents charge the players anywhere from
three to five percent of the player's salary for compensation for negotiations
with team management.l" This publication will serve to alert players seeking
representation of the average fees charged by agents, and will inform agents
of the competitive pricing of their counterparts." '
VII. CONCLUSION
Arbitration has recently become the preferred forum for settling disputes
in professional sports. This procedure offers a viable alternative to parties
wishing to avoid the normal time delay of the judicial process. The
NFLPA's unique arbitration system was instituted to specifically cover
disputes arising between players and their agents. This fast, efficient system
has handled over sixty cases, with others presently pending, and has been
112. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 109, Introduction.
113. Id. § 3(A)(1). A copy of the Representation Agreement must be mailed to the
NFLPA within 30 days of execution. If a copy of the Representation Agreement is not mailed
to the NFLPA within 30 days, the agreement becomes unenforceable by the agent, but continues
to be enforceable by the player, at his option.
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instrumental in shaping proper standards of conduct in the player-agent
relationship.
The NFLPA's arbitration procedure articulates time guidelines to ensure
rapid dispute resolution. 17 A player or agent may initiate the procedure by
filing a written grievance setting forth the facts and circumstances giving rise
to the grievance and the relief sought. The opposing party must then file an
answer within ten days of receipt of the grievance. The arbitrator, who is
provided with copies of all relevant documents from the NFLPA, then selects
a time and place for the hearing, which usually occurs within a year from the
initial grievance." This quick method of relief has enabled both players and
agents to recover money owed to them.
The arbitrators have ruled very equitably, even circumventing contractual
clauses to allow an agent to collect payment for services performed. Awards
based on quantum meruit are a familiar result in the cases, unless the agent
has breached the fiduciary duty owed to the player, in which case the agent
is denied any compensation. A close analysis of these cases is important in
order to predict future rulings and prescribe the proper conduct to be
displayed by professional football players and their agents.
The NFLPA's decision to decertify as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the players has not altered the arbitration procedure. The
NFLPA Regulations have been amended and renamed the Code of Conduct,
which contains an almost identical arbitration procedure. The sole change is
the deletion of the mediation mechanism. In fact, this deletion has expedited
the arbitration process because the parties are no longer required to attempt
to mediate their dispute, but can proceed directly to a formal arbitration
hearing. Although minor changes will also appear in the representation
agreement, the arbitration provision remains because of its past success.
This detailed arbitration procedure may be amended from time to time, but
disputes will continually be subject to arbitration due to its inclusion in the
representation agreement signed by players and their agents. Therefore,
players and agents should shape their behavior according to prior arbitration
decisions, because future arbitrators will likely view these cases as precedent
in developing a proper "code of conduct" for NFL players and their agents.
Jeffrey D. Meyer
117. CODE OF CONDUcr, supra note 109, § 5.
118. Id.
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